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Open pit copper mine
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Many governments around the world are thinking critically about their international
investment treaties and international investment policy, spurred in part by growing public
pressure and debate about how to best attract and govern multinational enterprises.
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flows are the types of investment they want. States are also
considering whether any potential benefits in terms of investment
flows outweigh the costs of these treaties in terms of litigation
expenses, potential liability, reduced policy space, or other
considerations; and whether there are other policies that are better
tailored to meet their investment attraction and development
objectives. Some traditionally capital exporting states are also
assessing whether their investment treaties are consistent with their
stated development policies toward their capital importing partners.4
Accordingly, states increasingly recognize the importance of taking
stock of existing investment treaties as well as policies regarding
future texts, and are more strategically considering the advantages
and disadvantages of these agreements, and whether, when and on
what terms to sign, maintain, or amend them. This research paper
aims to help that analysis by (1) providing an overview of literature
on the costs and benefits of investment treaties with ISDS, and (2)
examining policy implications and conclusions.
In summary, this paper highlights that the costs of investment treaties
are increasingly apparent, but the benefits largely unproven; thus, it
is an opportune time for countries to review their policies and
practices regarding these instruments. The conclusion of this paper
also suggests practical steps that states can take to assess these costs
and benefits, and identifies considerations and strategies relevant for
managing obligations contained in existing treaties and shaping
future agreements.
Farmers working in onion
plantations in Argapura,
Indonesia. 
Several phenomena are driving this heightened attention: One is that
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims brought under
international investment treaties have been on the rise, involving a
broadening set of claims, and seeking millions, or even billions, of
dollars in damages for alleged breaches of fairly open-ended treaty
standards. As of July 31, 2017, 817 known ISDS claims had been filed,
and at least 114 states had faced formal claims.1 This is particularly
staggering given that the first ISDS case was filed only 30 years ago and
fewer than 50 cases had been filed before the year 2000.2 This means
that the implications of investment treaties and ISDS have really only
become apparent in the last 15 years. 
A second and related factor is that negotiations of new treaties have
attracted greater public attention. Some of these new agreements are
unprecedented in terms of the breadth of investment they cover, the
restraints they place on countries’ powers to regulate investors and
investments and the complexity of their provisions; others, such as
the texts concluded by Brazil, are also attracting attention for their
decision to eschew strong investor protections in favor of a more
pragmatic focus on investment promotion.3
A third factor is that states are focused on attracting investment that
will help propel their sustainable economic growth and development
and, in that context, are evaluating the policies and tools that are
effective and efficient in advancing that aim. As part of that evaluation,
they are reassessing whether investment treaties do in fact help
increase investment flows and, more specifically, whether induced
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EXPECTED BENEFITS
Increased inward investment
A common rationale offered for investment
treaties is that they and their ISDS provisions
can encourage investment. Evidence that
investment treaties have the effect of
increasing investment flows is, however,
inconclusive.5 In short, 
‘common assumptions about the role of
[bilateral investment treaties (BITs)] in
attracting foreign investment are
unsupported by a considerable amount of
quantitative and qualitative evidence. For
the vast majority of investors, BITs do not
appear to be important – directly or
indirectly – when determining where, and
how much, to invest abroad’.6
INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH
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Studies on determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) confirm
that other factors – such as market size and growth, the availability
of natural resources, and the quality of hard and soft infrastructure –
tend to be far more important to investors than investment treaties
when making the decision to invest.7 This helps explain why, for
example, investment flows between the United States and China are
high despite the absence of an investment treaty, and why Brazil has
continued to be a major destination for foreign investment despite
having ratified no investment treaties with ISDS. Similarly, it helps
explain why countries that have stepped away from investment
treaties do not appear to have suffered losses of FDI: 
»       South Africa announced several years ago that it would be
terminating its BITs, and has since terminated almost all of its
agreements with capital exporting states;8 yet it has continued
to be the top African destination for FDI projects through 2016;9
»       Indonesia announced in 2014 that it would terminate its BITs and
has since terminated 27 of 53 BITs previously in force;10
nevertheless, in 2016, ‘FDI into Indonesia by capital investment
increased by 130% to $38.5 billion as a result of multiple metals,
chemicals and coal, oil and natural gas projects’;11 and
»       India, which released a new model BIT in 2015 that was notably
narrower in its protections than its previous agreements, became
the leading destination for FDI in Asia.12 That spot was previously
held by China,13 a country which, in contrast to India, has been
expanding its BIT network and increasing the breadth and
strength of its commitments in those agreements. 
While these examples are anecdotal, empirical evidence that BITs lead
to increased foreign investment is also inconclusive.14 Overall,
available evidence does not support the hypothesis that BITs result
in higher investment flows than in the counterfactual case. 
Moreover, while an investor may naturally want the strong substantive
and procedural protections that an investment treaty can provide, and
may therefore structure its investment so as to ensure that it is covered
by a favorable investment treaty (e.g., by establishing an affiliate in a
nominal “home” country, and routing its investment through that
affiliate),15 that does not mean that the investor would not have made
its investment in a particular host state, absent the investment treaty
or with an investment treaty offering weaker protections. Thus, even if
investment treaties and ISDS were found to influence whether FDI
flows originate in or flow through a particular “home” country, that
does not mean that those treaties actually affect investors’ decisions
on whether or how much to invest in a particular host country. At most,
we may be able to say that investors will often seek to take advantage
of all available legal protections when making their investment
decisions, including how to structure their investments.
To the extent that political risk is a limiting factor hindering foreign
investment, other means are available to investors to protect
themselves against some of the risks associated with investing abroad.
Various public and private risk insurers, for example, provide coverage
that supports outward investment by reducing exposure to political
risks.16 But, more broadly, it is exceedingly unclear that investment
treaties (which effectively act as free political risk insurance and
provide compensation when certain kinds of political risks materialize)
address many of the conditions and limiting factors that are hindering
investment. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness
Index, for example, considers factors such as corruption, crime, theft,
tax rates and other issues that hinder investment; those factors are not
specifically addressed by investment treaties.17
Importantly, even if there were a link between investment treaties and
FDI flows, investment agreements and their protections can
potentially undermine investment and its intended benefits.
For one, there is evidence that the mere initiation of an ISDS claim
against a country can result in a drop in FDI into that country; and, if
the country loses that ISDS case, that the drop is even more
significant.18 Thus, even if ISDS were to spur additional FDI, those
positive effects might later be negated by an ISDS claim – which is
easy for an investor to file – or loss of an ISDS dispute. 
A second issue is that some early-stage investors have reportedly used
the threat of ISDS claims as a bargaining tool in order to secure an
investment in the host state. In Bear Creek v Peru, for example, the
investor appears to have used its ISDS claims in order to press the
host government to approve the investor’s controversial mining
projects that the government had rejected.19 Investments that a
government allows in order to settle or avoid a potentially costly ISDS
claim technically count as investment inflows but may not be the type
of FDI that brings benefits to the host country. 
A third consideration is that, while investment treaties may be seen as
favorable by some investors, they may also reduce the host country’s
ability to secure ample revenues desirable for other investors (and
other stakeholders). Wellhausen, for example, highlights that many
investors use investment treaties to challenge measures that were
taken by the government in order to raise revenues or reduce costs,
such as decisions to impose new taxes or terminate incentives or
subsidies. ‘Because sovereign bondholders ultimately care most about
debt serviceability’, they may be ‘indifferent to – or even rewarding of’
such revenue-raising or cost-reducing measures.20 Nevertheless, those
are precisely the types of measures that have come under repeated
attack through ISDS claims. Thus, investment treaty rules, which can
reduce governments’ willingness or ability to adopt new revenue-
raising or cost-saving policies, may ultimately make it more difficult
for governments to raise funds through issuing sovereign bonds.21More
generally, by reducing or threatening governments’ powers to increase
their revenue, investment treaties can also reduce the amount of
government resources available for public investments in education
and infrastructure that are in fact crucial for domestic and international
investors and the country’s sustainable development. 
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Work by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has similarly questioned whether the special
rights given to some investors under investment treaties may
discourage support from other potential project funders. Examining
the implications of shareholder claims for reflective loss, which are
only exceptionally allowed in advanced systems of corporate law22
but are now commonly permitted in ISDS cases,23 the OECD notes that
such shareholder claims may have a range of impacts harmful to
companies, including potentially increasing risks for, and,
consequently the cost of capital offered by, creditors.24
A fourth issue, and one which is discussed further below in the
discussion on costs, is that even if the protections offered by
investment treaties were found to be effective in increasing FDI flows,
those protections may come at a high cost as judged both by what is
actually necessary, and by impacts on other economic, social, and/or
environmental goals. Governments could, in theory, guarantee
investors protections against all future losses caused by technological
change, new environmental regulations, or evolving societal
demands. Such policies insulating the investors from risks might well
induce their investment. But is that a good policy? Protections of such
broad scope may encourage investment, but tie the government’s
hands when it comes to advancing the country’s development goals
and/or could drain public budgets when investors suffer relevant
losses. Moreover, such government-provided insurance could give rise
to moral hazards, encouraging undesirable risk-taking by companies
and weakening investors’ incentives to reduce risks by striving to meet
societal demands, staying ahead of regulation, and driving
innovation. While the protections offered by investment treaties may
not be as broad as those offered in this hypothetical, it is offered to
highlight the importance of examining both benefits and costs.
Effectiveness in terms of increased investment cannot be the only
measure of “success”. The price paid in terms of liabilities assumed
by the public and undesirable behavioral signals sent to the investors
must also be taken into account.
Fifth, the investment covered by investment treaties is not necessarily
beneficial for the host state. While it is well known that international
investment – in particular FDI – can produce wide-ranging benefits in
host countries (e.g., bringing jobs, technology, know-how, and capital
across borders), it is also well known that those positive effects do not
always materialize. Research indicates that in certain contexts FDI can
crowd-out domestic firms,25 contribute to inequality,26 worsen
corruption,27 facilitate tax evasion and avoidance,28 and generate food
insecurity.29 Research also shows that the impact of FDI on the
environment can be good or bad.30 There is evidence that FDI creates
“pollution halos” and enables environmental “leapfrogging” –
phenomena whereby foreign investors bring newer, cleaner
technologies to the host country, thereby improving the environmental
performance of companies in that country.31 But in other cases, FDI
can leave a major environmental footprint, exacerbate pre-existing
environmental challenges and/or discourage environmental
policymaking.32 Depending on factors such as the type of investment,
the corporate culture of the investor and the institutional and
regulatory framework of the home and host countries, outcomes will
vary. It is important to remember that the potential benefits of FDI are
not automatic and that FDI can also result in economic, environmental
and social damage in the host country and to its citizens, and its
foreign origin can make it difficult to secure redress for harms caused.33
Investment treaties, however, generally protect investors irrespective
of the nature of the relevant investment, the conduct of the investor,
or the impacts of the investment.34 Tribunals have tended to reject
the argument that investment must contribute to economic
development in the host state in order to benefit from the treaty
protections.35 As one arbitrator has described it, this means that even
an ‘entity which is systematically earning its wealth at the expense of
the development of the host State’ can benefit from the protections
of investment treaties.36
In conclusion, it is crucial for states to not only examine whether
investment treaties result in increased investment into the host
country (which is itself inconclusive), but also (1) whether that
increased investment is induced investment or investment merely
structured to benefit from the treaty; (2) whether the investment is
actually desirable; and (3) whether any benefits of the investment
outweigh the price paid for the investment in terms of lost policy space
or other costs (more of which are discussed below). When conducting
that cost-benefit analysis, it is also important to assess distributional
consequences of relevant gains and losses. Evidence available to date
counsels that countries examining their investment treaty policies
should not assume positive outcomes in terms of investment flows or
that ultimate benefits will flow from investment treaties.
Increased outward investment 
Countries may also conclude investment treaties in order to benefit
their outward investors, based on the assumption that supporting
outward investment by those entities will produce benefits that flow
back into the home country. This raises two key issues that are similar
to the issues discussed in the context of inward investment. One is
whether the benefits offered by standard investment treaties are what
the home country’s outward investors truly want or need. What are the
barriers those individuals and firms face that limit their investments
abroad? Do the treaties help them overcome those barriers? Outward
investing firms, like inward investing firms, may very much like to use
the added leverage provided by investment treaties to bring or threaten
to bring a claim against their “host” states. But this does not mean that
the treaty will be influential in, much less essential to, the companies’
investment decisions in the first place (or worth the costs the home
country has assumed so as to provide its investors that leverage).37
The other question is whether, in what ways, and under what conditions
the home country actually benefits from the outward investment it
supports. While some studies show that outward FDI can benefit the
home country (e.g., helping home country firms to expand, access
resources, technology, and other assets, and become more efficient,
thereby increasing the strength, competitiveness, and profitability of
the home country’s economy), actual outcomes may vary. 
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FDI motivated by an effort to take advantage of low labor standards and
weak environmental regulation, for instance, can hollow out industry
in the home country, place downward pressure on environmental
regulation and labor standards and wages, and, depending on the tax
planning of the outward investing firm, leave the home (and host
countries) unable to use their tax policies to capture benefits of the
firm’s increased efficiency and profitability. FDI may result from a
company shutting down manufacturing in the home country and
moving to another country, lured to that new location by generous
incentives, low labor costs, lax environmental regulations, or other
advantages. That move may make the home country firm more
competitive, enabling it to increase its profitability and invest more in
research and development or other high-skilled activities in the home
country. While this can have beneficial impacts in the home country in
terms of increased tax revenue and creation of high-quality jobs, those
positive impacts do not necessarily materialize if, for instance, profits
are held offshore in tax havens rather than reinvested at home.38
Moreover, those who benefit from FDI are often not the same as those
who are negatively impacted, an outcome that can, without effective
policies in place, generate within-country inequalities and discord.39
Notably, there are other ways to support outward investment that can
be tailored to try to avoid negative impacts at home and abroad. The
United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), for
example, offers various kinds of financial products to assist United
States outward investors. Unlike investment treaty protection that is
provided to an investor regardless of the impacts of the investment,
OPIC’s eligibility criteria are designed to ensure that investment
projects demonstrably benefit the host country and do not harm the
US home economy.40
It is thus important to distinguish between the benefits investment
treaties offer to the outward investing firm and those received by the
home country, and then compare whether the costs borne by the
home country (and its constituents) outweigh their benefits. Just as
the amount of inward FDI is not an accurate proxy for measuring the
benefits investment treaties provide to host countries, the amount of
outward FDI (or even the amount of outward FDI actually induced by
the investment treaty) is not an accurate proxy for assessing whether
and to what extent the treaties benefit the home country. 
For countries assessing their outward investment policies, it is
therefore crucial to (1) consider whether, what types, and under what
circumstances outward investment provides positive spillovers into
the domestic economy, (2) identify (through, for example, the use of
surveys) limiting factors that are hindering optimal amounts and types
of outward investment, (3) consider what policy tools the government
has to help overcome those limiting factors and which are the most
appropriate tools to use, and (4) assess what complementary
measures the government might want to adopt to anticipate and
address negative effects the home country may experience – such as
a reduced tax base or increased unemployment among workers of
certain skill-sets – as a result of overseas investment promotion efforts.
Finally, it is important for home countries to consider how increased
investment may affect host countries, and to ensure that the investors
and projects the home countries support do not undermine
sustainable development abroad. 
“Depoliticization” of disputes 
Another key purported benefit of investment treaties is that, by
enabling investors to bring claims directly against the states in which
they have invested, the treaties “depoliticize” those disputes.41 From
the perspective of the host state, this appeals to the host state’s desire
to be free from “gunboat diplomacy”, diplomatic protection, or other
political or economic sanctions imposed by the investor’s home state
as a result of the host state’s alleged mistreatment of the investor.42
Depoliticization from the home state’s perspective appeals to the
home state’s desire to avoid muddying its diplomatic relations with
the host state by getting involved in disputes between the home state’s
investors and their foreign host governments.43 The theory is that by
providing investors the ability to bring arbitration claims directly
against their host governments, the home state need not be involved.
Additionally, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention)44 – a
treaty governing enforcement of international arbitration awards –
bars the home state from ‘giv[ing] diplomatic protection, or bring[ing]
an international claim, in respect of a dispute’ already initiated by its
investor against the host state under the ICSID Convention.45
However, as discussed below, in both theory and practice, the specific
contribution of investment treaties and, more specifically, ISDS, to the
objective of depoliticizing investment disputes is uncertain. Moreover,
“politicization” may not be as much of a problem as it is often portrayed
to be and, in fact, may in some cases and from some perspectives even
be preferable to more legalistic forms of dispute resolution. 
Treaty provisions and related legal rules on depoliticization
From the host state’s perspective, investment treaties and the rules
governing ISDS do not necessarily provide any practical or legal shields
from involvement in the dispute by the home state. This is because:
»       In all investor-state disputes, the home state is able to involve its
political machinery both before any arbitration has been
initiated (so as to influence a host state’s actions toward an
investor)46 and after an award has been issued if the host state
fails to comply with that ISDS award;47
»       In all non-ICSID investor-state disputes (e.g., investor-state
arbitrations under the New York Convention, unless the investment
treaty states otherwise), the home country can pursue diplomatic
relief on behalf of its investor while the dispute is pending;
»       Restrictions that are included in the ICSID Convention or in the
underlying investment treaty on the use of diplomatic protection
can be undermined through treaty shopping and parallel claims;48
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»       The home state can still make political decisions regarding
whether and/or how to get involved in an ISDS dispute through
such means as providing (or deciding not to provide) a tribunal
with its interpretation of the underlying investment treaty,49 or
through other means, such as being more or less willing to
provide evidence relevant to the dispute; and
»       The home state may be able to pursue action against the host
state under the investment treaty irrespective of whether an
investor has already initiated a claim.50
Moreover, it is likely giving investment treaties and ISDS too much credit
to trace the decline of “gunboat diplomacy” to ISDS’s mere existence. If
ISDS were unavailable, we cannot assume that home states would
resort to force in violation of other norms of international law. 
Similarly, from the perspective of the home state, even when
investment treaty protection and ISDS are available to its investors,
the home state possesses numerous opportunities to exercise
discretion and determine whether and how to become involved in
disputes between those investors and their host governments. The
availability of ISDS may give home states an excuse to deflect those
investors that solicit government assistance in resolving a dispute,
but it does not require the home government to always adopt a
hands-off approach, a fact that investors may be likely to highlight
when pressing their home governments for support. 
Evidence of impacts of depoliticization
While very little is known about the extent to which the availability of
ISDS actually impacts home state and host state experiences of
politicization, studies that have been done suggest that the presence
or absence of an investment treaty with ISDS does not seem to
influence whether or not the investor’s home state is likely to place
diplomatic pressure on – or take adverse diplomatic action against –
the host state in connection with an investor-state dispute.51
More specifically, a recent analysis of United States practices
regarding concerns of its investors concluded the following:
Whether or not an investor has access to treaty-based investment
arbitration appears to make little difference to how strongly the
US government applies diplomatic pressure to resolve the
dispute. Just as the FDI-impact of the treaties has been
disappointing, the de-politicization promise of the investment
treaty regime may have failed [to deliver] as well. This could be
important for developing countries seeking to revisit their
investment protection policies, as it raises questions [about]
whether the use of inter-state dispute settlement may not be a
better alternative to investor-state arbitration, as this at least has
the promise of less controversial and adventurist legal claims. 
…
[O]ur results indicate that even for such a highly legalized regime,
diplomatic considerations still play core functions in the
settlement of disputes. This is as expected in realist approaches
to international relations and warrants the question, whether the
promise of depoliticization from international legalization may
be more fiction than fact.52
Other studies have also questioned the underlying objective of
depoliticizing disputes. As Yackee has stated: 
Politicized dispute settlement need not entail, or even risk, resort
to force. Indeed, it can be apparently successful, especially where
home and host state governments, and perhaps also the
investor, perceive mutual gains from continued cooperation. This
does not mean that investors get everything they want, when
they want it. In politicized dispute settlement the investor does
not control the process—though he can certainly influence it—
and the investor’s interests are not the only ones in play.53
In other words, according to Yackee, political resolution of investor-
state disputes at the state-to-state level can moderate the investor’s
claims, while also helping to find an effective solution acceptable to
the home state, host state, and investor.
For countries assessing their investment policies, these issues and
experiences highlight the need to carefully assess whether
“politicization” is a warranted concern or may in fact be more
desirable than investors’ untethered access to legal recourse. States
can then consider what tools are effective to achieve the desired
outcomes in terms of (de)politicization (for example, by considering
what role ISDS has played, and whether and how legalized state-state
dispute settlement may differ) and at what cost.
Oil palm plantation 
in Malaysia. 
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COSTS
This section briefly summarizes the costs of investment treaty
protection and ISDS. It provides an overview of seven main categories
of costs. These are: (1) costs of litigation; (2) costs of liability; (3)
reputational costs; (4) costs in terms of reduced policy space; (5) costs
in terms of reduced power in contractual relations; (6) costs in terms
of a reduced role for domestic law-making; and (7) costs in terms of
generating uncertainty in the law. 
Litigation 
The costs of defending treaty claims brought by investors can be
significant. Studies have estimated that it costs each disputing party
roughly USD 5 million per case on average to cover legal fees and the
costs of the arbitral tribunal.54 Given that those are average figures,
there are of course examples of disputes in which the costs were lower
and those in which they were higher. In 13 of the 56 ICSID cases
concluded between 2011 and 2015 for which data is available, the
respondent’s legal expenses were less than USD 1 million.55 But in
some cases, costs have vastly exceeded USD 5 million. In the Yukos
arbitration disputes, for instance, the respondent state’s costs were
USD 27 million (and the claimant’s costs roughly USD 80 million).56
Additionally, in Libananco v Turkey, the respondent’s costs were nearly
USD 36 million (while the claimant’s were roughly USD 24 million).57
Even if a state successfully defends the case brought against it, it may
still have to pay those expenses.58 While tribunals sometimes order
investor/claimants that lose their ISDS claims to compensate
respondent states for the states’ legal expenses, this happens
infrequently (in 38% of the cases that investor/claimants lose), and less
frequently than the percentage of cases (53%) in which tribunals require
losing states to compensate successful investor/claimants for their legal
expenses.59 Moreover, even when tribunals order unsuccessful
investor/claimants to compensate the government for its legal
expenses and costs, states may face challenges recovering those orders
against the investor. If the investor refuses or fails to pay voluntarily,60
the state will need to take enforcement action, requiring additional
commitments of time and resources. The state may ultimately be
unable to recover from the investor if the investor is insolvent or
structures its holdings in order to make its assets judgment-proof.61
Liability
A second category of costs is actual liability. Based on publicly
available information, the average amount claimed by investors as of
the end of 2016 was $1.4 billion, and the average amount awarded
was $545 million, plus interest.62 Most awards are under $100 million,
but there have been a number of large awards, including some
awards for multiple billions of dollars.
Trends over time indicate that amounts awarded have been rising.63
This may be due in part to the fact that ‘[t]ribunals are increasingly
willing to accept income based approaches … which capture future
profits or returns’.64 Additionally, tribunals have been increasingly willing
to award compound interest, a practice which can significantly increase
the amount the state is ordered to pay.65 In cases decided before 2000,
tribunals awarded compound interest in roughly 40% of the cases. In
cases decided between 2011 and 2015, that number had risen to 86%.66
Overall, potential liability under investment treaties can be significant
for governments. Especially for emerging economies, and when the
claim arises out of an extractive industry project involving valuable
natural resources, liability can amount to a sizeable proportion of
government budgets. These considerations are highly relevant for
countries when considering the potential liability that they are willing
and able to assume. 
Reputational costs
In addition to the costs of litigation and liability, states may also face
reputational costs as a result of ISDS claims. As noted above, one
study found that the mere filing of an ISDS claim against a state is
connected with reduced inward FDI flows, and that inward FDI flows
drop even further when the state loses an ISDS case.67 For
governments seeking and competing for foreign capital, this may be
especially disconcerting. 
Reduced policy space
Another set of costs investment treaties and their ISDS mechanisms
impose on states is the cost of reduced policy space.68 Given their range
of responsibilities, governments need policy space to ensure that they
are able to enact, implement, revise, refine, and enforce their laws,
policies and practices in order to achieve public interest objectives,
and to do so in light of changing circumstances, evidence, needs and
priorities. Policy space enables legislatures to adopt new laws and
amend or terminate existing legislation; it enables executive officials
to set policies, refine them over time, and exercise discretion as
appropriate; and it enables administrative tribunals and judicial courts
to perform the roles assigned to them under domestic law in
interpreting, applying, and even crafting the law, ruling on the scope
of public and private rights and obligations, and invalidating or
imposing penalties on illegal or undesirable conduct. This policy space
can be especially important for governments whose legal frameworks
are still evolving and developing to reflect best international practice.
Such policy space is, of course, not unlimited. Even absent investment
treaties and ISDS, it is constrained, for example, by domestic norms of
due process and separation of powers, and international customary
and treaty law on human rights. Thus, the objection with investment
treaties is not that they limit government power, but that they do so
in ways that go beyond those other constraints, and that they unduly
discourage or require compensation for good faith action taken in the
public interest to achieve economic, social, and environmental aims. 
Some arbitral tribunals have interpreted investment treaty standards
to offer investors expansive protections for their property rights and
expectations that many countries at the national level have long been
unwilling to provide. 
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One example arises out of the protection for “indirect expropriation.” While
the domestic laws of many countries require governments to compensate
individuals/entities for “direct” expropriations (e.g., nationalizations of
property in which the government actually appropriates the investor’s
property), they do not always specifically protect against or require
compensation for “indirect expropriations” or “regulatory expropriations”
(e.g., good faith regulatory measures adopted by the government that
have the effect of reducing the value of an individual or entity’s private
property). Furthermore, determinations in domestic jurisdictions as to
whether and under which circumstances such compensation is warranted
are based on legal, political and sociological determinations that often
ebb and flow over time. In the United States, for example, the doctrine of
regulatory takings/indirect expropriation is infamously complex and
controversial, and has generated significant academic literature and policy
debate regarding whether and, if so,  property owners should be
compensated for executive, legislative, or judicial conduct that negatively
impacts those property owners’ rights or interests. The United States
Supreme Court is frequently called upon to guide the evolution of this area
of law, and in so doing must carefully consider nuanced legal principles
that require balancing among competing interests and obligations.
Arbitral tribunals have generally interpreted investment treaties to
require governments to pay compensation for direct and indirect
expropriations (even if the treaty does not specifically refer to indirect
expropriation), an interpretation that can give rise to significant potential
liability for a wide range of actions taken by the government to resolve
matters of public interest. Arbitral tribunals are not required to consider
competing governmental obligations or interests that may have led to
certain actions. Measures that can be challenged on the ground that
they constitute an “indirect expropriation” include adoption of zoning
regulations that limit a potential property developer’s options;
deregulation of industries that aims to increase competition but hurts
the position of former monopolies; restrictions or bans on mining;
adoption of requirements for companies to pay employees health and
safety benefits; and regulation of pricing for a wide range of goods and
services such as crops, energy, water, and pharmaceuticals. 
Arbitrators are not bound by domestic law or policy on these issues, and
have interpreted treaties to provide even stronger levels of protection
against indirect takings than afforded under the laws of many domestic
jurisdictions, even when they have domestic laws covering indirect
takings.69 In addition to these protections against indirect expropriation,
investment treaties typically provide strong protections for economic
rights and expectations through their “fair and equitable treatment”
clauses, clauses that impose standards of conduct on states and offer
remedies to investors that may go well beyond what is otherwise
available domestically.70 As Santiago Montt has noted: 
It is shocking to consider that a United States investor may lose
a case against its government in the United States Supreme
Court, a German investor may lose the same case in the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court), and a French
investor may lose it in the Conseil d’État, but, nevertheless, that
any of them may win it against a Sri Lanka or Bolivia on the basis
of such open-ended [IIA] principles as no expropriation without
compensation or [fair and equitable treatment].71
While there is considerable disagreement in domestic laws and
international law as to whether and in what circumstances
government-caused changes to property rights or expectations trigger
a duty of compensation, the fact that government actions or
omissions regularly cause changes in property rights protections is
undeniable. Indeed, even among Western nations that are considered
to have relatively clear and strong property rights rules, change has
long been endemic. As David Kennedy has highlighted:
In the history of the West, one has repeatedly started over,
inventing new kinds of property, eliminating or qualifying old
property rights and reallocating obligations and entitlements with
respect to resources. The invention of the limited liability
corporation, the abolition of slavery, the establishment – or later
privatization – of state enterprises or quasi-public institutions to
manage new modes of infrastructure, the establishment of zoning
regulations, changing rules about securitization, the invention of
commodity futures, or the changes in intellectual property rules
which have accompanied technological changes over the last
century are among the most common examples. Changes in
modes of economic activity have as often destroyed entitlements
and settled expectations about access to resources and the value
of assets as they have given rise to new rights, new duties, new
privileges and new obligations. New modes of property have
continually been devised to empower new types of actors in new
kinds of economic relationships, exploiting new forms of
knowledge or new resources. Existing entitlements can and often
have been reallocated, either slowly or quite precipitously as part
of a conscious project of social and historical renewal or struggle.72
Contrary to these patterns, and irrespective of how domestic laws and
institutions have decided to approach these issues, investment law
as interpreted through ISDS decisions has tended to disfavor change
and reallocations and emphasizes instead the importance of ensuring
that investors and their investments are able to enjoy stability in legal
rules (when such stability benefits them).73 That the government was
acting in good faith, for the public interest, and in compliance with
domestic law is not generally a defense.74
Provisions in investment treaties imposing restrictions on “performance
requirements” can further prevent governments from using policy tools
designed to ensure the host country effectively leverages foreign
investment for long-term and inclusive economic growth;75 and
provisions preventing discrimination can give rise to liability for
development and implementation of crucial domestic policies when
those policies have a disparate impact on foreign investors.76 Investment
treaties therefore place on governments an unprecedented set of
constraints limiting their ability to regulate domestic economic activity. 
In addition to limiting government action, investment treaties also
have been interpreted to impose mandates regarding what
affirmative conduct is expected of the state, and how it must allocate
its often scarce resources. For instance, in Ampal-American Israel Corp
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT |  13
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES
v Egypt, the tribunal concluded that Egypt’s failure to protect the
investor’s investment against terrorist attacks violated the investment
treaty’s “full protection and security” obligation.77 That decision,
involving a relatively common provision in investment treaties,
effectively imposed on the host state a duty to provide the investor
an expansive ‘insurance policy for terrorism’.78 According to Howse,
the implications are troubling: 
Failed or fragile states can scarce afford to indemnify investors,
often in the [hundreds] of millions of dollars for risks they can far
from fully control. … In effect, the consequence of this decision
is that investors would likely be put above all other victims of
terrorism and related political violence in conflict areas. That is
shocking from the perspective of international justice.79
However shocking, arbitral decisions are binding; thus, states that
face terrorist attacks may also face significant liability for failing to
take action to prevent those attacks. For many states, this is a risk that
should be considered, particularly when one such claim has already
been successful.
States have also been found liable for failing to take adequate action
to halt protests that disrupt investment projects. In Copper Mesa v.
Ecuador, for instance, the tribunal determined that the government
violated the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full
protection and security obligation for not doing enough to protect
the claimant’s proposed mining project from disruptions caused by
local community members concerned about the mine’s potential
impacts. According to the three arbitrators deciding the ISDS case,
“Plainly, the Government in Quito could hardly have declared war on
its own people. Yet, in the Tribunal’s view, it could not do nothing.”80
Overall, the implications of investment treaties for a state’s domestic
policy space are broad: the treaties generally govern conduct by all
levels (local, provincial, and federal) and branches (executive, legislative
and judicial) of government. States can even be held liable for acts of
state-owned enterprises (e.g., related to the state-owned enterprises’
handling of disputes with foreign shareholders or joint venture partners)
or based on their failure to adequately prevent, remedy, or otherwise
address acts of private parties. While some treaties attempt to preclude
or limit arbitral tribunal review of certain types of measures (e.g.,
taxation measures or measures taken in emergencies), investment
treaties typically allow claims against government conduct in all policy
spheres, from financial regulation to environmental protection. 
Due to the breadth of actions and inactions vulnerable to claims, fully
assessing costs in terms of possible challenges to government policy
space is particularly difficult. Nevertheless, governments ought to
understand the extent to which investment treaties, as they have been
interpreted by arbitral tribunals, give covered investors/investments
protections that go beyond domestic law (covering indirect or
regulatory takings, guaranteeing legal and regulatory stability,
protecting the expectations of investors including with respect to
receiving permits and future profits, insuring investors against attacks
of third parties including local communities, etc.). 
Even in cases in which an action may have also been improper under
domestic law, the remedies under international law may be more
onerous. In many jurisdictions, for example, individuals and enterprises
are able to challenge administrative conduct as being wrongful, but the
remedy may be procedural or an award of declaratory relief, not
compensation. Additionally, awards of compensation, if available under
domestic law, may be limited to sunk costs, or may be capped. Under
investment law, those same rules and restrictions on remedies do not
apply, and governments may be liable for millions or billions of dollars,
including for future lost profits. Countries should carefully assess the
strength of their treaties’ requirements and remedies as compared to
domestic law and whether the treaties’ stronger protections and greater
remedies for investors are justified.81
Distorted power dynamics
Certain sectors and types of investments appear to give rise to a
significant proportion of claims. These include investments in exploration
for or exploitation of natural resources and investments in infrastructure
and public services that are governed by investor-state contracts, permits
or licenses.82 There are a number of likely reasons for this:
»       such investments are often of major public importance and may
have substantial impacts on the environment, society or public
services. These investments therefore warrant robust roles for
government regulators and regulations, which in turn can give rise
to increased opportunities for investor-state disagreements;83
»       such investments are often long-term and so can be impacted
by changing circumstances and knowledge causing the
government and/or the investor to seek to modify the original
terms of the investment or contents of the governing legal
framework. When the modification is sought by the government,
and would have a negative impact on the investment, that can
also trigger ISDS claims;84
»       investments in infrastructure and provision of public services
often are made in connection with complex privatization schemes
involving previously unknown private sector partners, new
government institutions and governance regimes, and
heightened uncertainty and public concern about such issues as
the future of employment in state-owned entities and the price
and quality of goods and services produced. The number and
nature of unknowns associated with major privatizations increase
the likelihood that things will not proceed as originally planned
or hoped by at least some stakeholders, and the political and
public sensitivities involved raise the stakes of failure or dashed
expectations. As noted above, through investment treaties and
ISDS, investors are given strong powers to protect their
expectations and resist any public- or government-requested
change to what are frequently nascent and sensitive privatization
schemes when such change would disadvantage those investors;
additionally, investment treaties and ISDS give investors powerful
tools to push the government to modify the framework when
such changes are sought by the investors;
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»       investments in natural resources, infrastructure, and public services
are often governed by contracts or quasi-contractual instruments
such as permits or licenses. Investment treaties give investors
strong powers to enforce the beneficial terms of those deals as
strictly written, while also enabling them to contest enforcement
and seek renegotiation of unfavorable provisions; investors are also
able to claim that they are entitled to transparent and good faith
conduct from their government counterparty to the contract even
if underlying contract law does not impose such obligations and
therefore does not entitle the government to benefit from the same
treatment from the private sector party;85 and
»       the amounts claimed in ISDS cases relating to these types of
investments often reach into the hundreds of millions if not
billions of dollars, making the cases, though expensive to pursue,
worthwhile to bring. This also attracts the attention and support
of third party funders, whose backing may result in
claimant/investors pursuing claims they would otherwise have
been too risk averse to pursue.86
The power given to the private party in these cases to opt out of the
governing legal framework (e.g., the contract and the law of the host
state, a third state, and/or international law) and out of the dispute
resolution forum otherwise provided for in law or in the contract (e.g.,
domestic arbitration or dispute resolution in domestic courts) can enable
the investor to effectively secure a deal it had not, in fact, originally
obtained from the government, and hold governments to exacting
standards of conduct in highly complex and high-stakes scenarios.87 This
grants investors disproportionate power vis-à-vis government partners
and makes it especially difficult for governments to appreciate fully or
limit liabilities they have assumed under investor-state contracts or
quasi-contractual arrangements.88 This outcome - in which investors are
given greater powers in their relations with host country governments --
is often argued to be justified and important in light of investors’ general
vulnerability to host state actors. Indeed, one common narrative
characterizing infrastructure investments points to the phenomenon of
the “obsolescing bargain,” in which an investor, once it has significant
fixed assets in a country, is considered to be at the whim of host
government power and discretion. Based on that narrative, it is
contended that, in order to ensure a level playing field, investors should
seek international legal protection by structuring their investments so as
to take advantage of a favorable investment treaty. However, some
evidence suggests that rather than exploiting evolving power dynamics,
government parties to infrastructure contracts with private entities may
more commonly be the victims of power shifts and investor-initiated
efforts to change the terms of the deal after it has been agreed.89
Reduced role for domestic law-making
Since investment treaties typically permit investors to bring investor-
state arbitration claims in addition to or instead of pursuing relief before
domestic courts, arbitral tribunals, as opposed to domestic courts,
often have key powers to determine important issues of domestic law
that relate to the dispute, including issues of first impression on
questions of domestic law or the meaning of contractual provisions. 
In many jurisdictions, domestic courts play a fundamental role in
determining issues such as the conditions that need to be satisfied in
order for valid investor-state contracts to be formed, and whether
certain provisions contained in investor-state contracts are
enforceable (or, for example, whether they are void due to being ultra
vires or inconsistent with public policy).90 When investors take their
claims directly to arbitration, however, it is the arbitrators, not the
courts, that rule on those important issues of contract law and policy
and may come to dramatically different conclusions than domestic
courts regarding the meaning or legitimacy of a given contractual
provision. The state thus loses its power to shape and interpret its law. 
Similarly, to the extent that investors take their general grievances
regarding host state conduct to ISDS tribunals rather than domestic
courts, tribunals usurp the roles of those domestic courts (or
administrative agencies) in interpreting and applying domestic law
on issues of both substance and procedure.91
Uncertainty in the law
A final set of costs are those that arise from uncertainty in the law. Due
to several factors including vague language used in investment treaties
and the non-precedential nature of ISDS decisions, it is extremely
difficult to understand with certainty whether or not a given claim has
merit and, if so, what the damages awarded might be. Indeed, both
investors and states have spent years litigating relatively simple issues
of jurisdiction, requiring expenditures of time and legal fees. The
uncertainty makes it extremely difficult and costly for governments to
assess the likelihood that their conduct conflicts with treaty standards,
and communicate relevant information about investment treaty
standards to the diverse range of government actors whose conduct
could potentially give rise to claims. The uncertainty and
corresponding costs could also discourage states from adopting or
maintaining contested measures.92 As academics have explained:
[I]nvestment treaty protections that provide decision-makers
with greater certainty about how the protection would apply to
government measures will reduce the chilling of permissible
measures. Investment treaty protections that give arbitrators
unstructured discretions or that turn on ex post judgments that
decision-makers cannot easily predict when considering the
adoption of measures prospectively are likely to be associated
with greater uncertainty and greater chilling of measures that
would have been permissible.93
Some governments may be more sensitive to regulatory chill than others.
In particular, those with limited resources to fund potential liabilities,
provide required defenses, and risk reputational costs, and those
dependent on other countries for development assistance, economic
relations or diplomatic support, may be less willing to ultimately maintain
the measures that have been challenged and spend the years and
millions of dollars typically required to counter ISDS claims.94
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Oil palm plantation 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS ON COSTS & BENEFITS
As states look back over decades of treaty practice, the expected
benefits have not clearly materialized, whereas the costs have been
unexpectedly high. These costs are particularly high for countries with
foreign investment in long-term, strategic and/or lucrative industries;
those with developing legal systems or pre-existing government
challenges requiring ongoing regulatory reforms; and those with
complex diplomatic relationships with more powerful countries;
among others. Absent evidence that:
1.     treaty protections benefiting investors and investments are
causing increased investment flows, 
2.     those increased flows due to the investment treaties (inward or
outward) are beneficial to the home country, and
3.     the benefits outweigh the treaties’ costs, 
it is hard for states to justify the continuation of their investment
agreements or the conclusion of any new similar agreements.
PART III
NEXT STEPS
Solar and wind renewable
energy in Okinawa, Japan.
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Many countries around the world are taking
stock of and reassessing policies toward their
existing and future agreements. These steps
enable governments to ensure that current
and future investment treaties provide
desired benefits without unexpected and
high costs.
With respect to existing agreements, some
governments have decided to terminate,
amend, and/or clarify their previously
concluded texts. These steps are not
mutually exclusive. Some governments, for
instance, have first agreed to amend their
treaties to exclude the “survival clause”, and
then terminate the text.95 States have also
sought to use their interpretive powers under
international law to clarify certain broad and
vague provisions in their investment
treaties,96 while also providing notice to
terminate the agreements.97
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EXISTING TREATIES
For existing treaties, steps for states to consider include:
1.     Taking stock of existing treaties, including identifying 
for each treaty
a.     the treaty counter-party, 
b.     the treaty status (whether or not entered into force), 
c.      termination/renewal date and whether renewal 
         is automatic absent a notice to terminate,
d.     length of survival clause,
e.     amount and nature of investments covered,
f.       whether consent to ISDS is given and, if so, 
         how broad that consent is, and
g.     content of substantive obligations.
For treaties covering significant amounts of investment, it is crucial
to assess whether the treaty contains certain core provisions that give
rise to heightened risks, including broad, vaguely worded FET
obligations, protections against indirect expropriation, umbrella
clauses, and unrestricted transfer obligations. Treaties concluded a
decade or more ago in particular may have relatively strong and
potentially costly versions of these provisions.
2.     Developing a multi-stakeholder approach to gather input and
evaluate the treaties, assess their costs and benefits to different
constituencies, and formulate policy objectives. This includes
assessing how the obligations under the treaties compare with
those under domestic law,98 the extent of potential liability
generated by investment treaties due to the obligations’ strength
and remedies for breach, and whether/what aspects of the
investment environment are important for investors’ decisions; and
3.     Assessing whether, based on an analysis of the costs and benefits
of those agreements and its domestic policy objectives, a state
should maintain the agreements, renegotiate them, seek to
clarify them through interpretation of vague/broad provisions,
withdraw consent to ISDS, and/or terminate (on or before the
renewal/termination date).
FUTURE TREATIES
Additionally, governments are rethinking strategies regarding future
agreements, including the design of fundamentally different models
or moratoria on new texts. For future agreements, important steps for
states to consider include:
1.     Developing a multi-stakeholder approach to evaluate policy
objectives and priorities regarding inward and outward
investment, and to assess the relative effectiveness and costs
and benefits to different constituencies of using investment
treaties as a means of achieving those objectives; and
2.     If entering into negotiations for new investment agreements 
is determined to be an appropriate means of meeting 
policy objectives, 
a.      identifying criteria to assess whether and in what circumstances
         to engage in negotiations with another country; 
b.      determining the provisions, protections, and obligations
         that are desirable to include, following consideration of their
         costs and benefits; and
c.      formulating a model to be used as the basis  of those
         negotiations, as well as internal guidance regarding
         whether and under what circumstances deviations from
         different aspects of that model might be appropriate.
Transparent and multi-stakeholder processes are important: as the
complexity and costs of investment treaties have become more
apparent, officials have increasingly communicated with and sought
input from a broader range of constituents inside and outside the
government. These consultations can help states formulate
investment treaty policies that incorporate lessons learned and meet
modern objectives. They can enable states to:
»       identify risks of treaties (e.g., helping officials responsible for
environmental protection, health policy, taxation, financial
services regulation, energy regulation, and monetary policy
understand whether and in what contexts their actions may give
rise to liability under certain interpretations of the treaties),99
»       hear concerns of a range of investors and evaluate possible
policy interventions that can be adopted through treaty or
unilateral actions by home or host states,100
»       understand priorities and concerns of parliament and/or other
governing bodies, which will likely need to be considered and
addressed in order to secure approval of treaties and
amendments and minimize the political costs of such
agreements,101 and
»       appreciate the perspectives and concerns of the broader public
regarding the implications of investment treaties for such issues
as property rights and democratic governance.102
These processes are not necessarily fast.103 Yet in light of the long life-
spans and substantial implications of the treaties, and the importance
of having an effective investment attraction and governance
framework, it is crucial to take the necessary time to fully deliberate
and engage diverse perspectives regarding future courses of action.
18 |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
ANNEX I. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF STUDIES ON INVESTMENT TREATIES AND INVESTMENT FLOWS
ANNEX I. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF STUDIES ON
INVESTMENT TREATIES AND INVESTMENT FLOWS
(organized by date of the study)
Cotula, Lorenzo and others, China-Africa Investment Treaties: Do They
Work? (Global Environmental Institute 2016)
Bellak, Christian, ‘Economic Impact of Investment Agreements’ (2015)
Department of Economics Working Paper 200.
Chen, Hejing and others, ‘The Impact of BITs and DTTs on FDI Inflow
and Outflow Evidence from China’ (2015) CIGI Papers No. 75
Lejour, Arjan, and Maria Salfi, ‘The Regional Impact of Bilateral
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment’ (2015) CPB
Netherlands Bureau For Economic Policy Analysis No. 298 
Simmons, Beth A, ‘Bargaining Over BITs, Arbitrating Awards: The
Regime for Protection and Promotion of International Investment’
(2014) World Politics 66.01, 12-46
Berger, Axel and others, ‘Do Trade and Investment Agreements Lead
to More FDI? Accounting for Key Provisions Inside the Black Box’ (2013)
10(2) International Economics and Economic Policy 247
Bankole, Abiodun S, and Adeolu O Adewuyi, ‘Have BITs Driven FDI
Between ECOWAS Countries and EU?’ (201) 12(2) Journal of
International Trade Law and Policy 130
Rosendorff, B Peter, and Kongjoo Shin, Importing Transparency: The
Political Economy of Bits and FDI Flows (Manuscript, New York
University Political Science Department 2012)
Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt, ‘Contingent Credibility: The Impact
of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment’ (2011)
65(3) International Organization 401
Berger, Axel and others, ‘More Stringent BITs, Less Ambiguous Effects
On FDI? Not A Bit!’ (2011) 112(3) Economics Letters 270
Busse, Matthias and others, ‘FDI Promotion Through Bilateral Investment
Treaties: More Than a Bit?’ (2010) 146(1) Review of World Economics 147
Mina, Wasseem, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Encourage FDI in the
GCC Countries?’ (2010) 2 African Review of Economics and Finance 1
Yackee, Jason Webb, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence’
(2010) 51 Virginia Journal of International Law 397
Haftel, Yoram Z, ‘Ratification Counts: US Investment Treaties and FDI
Flows into Developing Countries’ (2010) 17(2) Review of International
Political Economy 348
Sachs, Lisa E and Karl P Sauvant, ‘BITs, DTTs, and FDI flows: An
Overview’, in Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs (eds), The Effect of
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009) xxvii-lxii.
Desbordes, Rodolphe, and Vincent Vicard, ‘Foreign Direct Investment
and Bilateral Investment Treaties: An International Political
Perspective’ (2009) 37(3) Journal of Comparative Economics 372
Kerner, Andrew, ‘Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and
Consequences Of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2009) 53
International Studies Quarterly 73
Mina, Wasseem, ‘External Commitment Mechanisms, Institutions, and
FDI In GCC Countries’ (2009) 19(2) Journal of International Financial
Markets, Institutions and Money 371
Büthe, Tim, and Helen V Milner, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Foreign Direct Investment: A Political Analysis’, in Karl P Sauvant and
Lisa E Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment:
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, And Investment
Flows (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 171-225
Yackee, Jason Webb, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible
Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote
Foreign Direct Investment?’ (2008) 42(4) Law & Society Review 805
Yackee, Jason W, ‘Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link
Between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment’ (2007)
University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No 1054 <
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015083>
accessed 28 February 2018
Swan, Stewart J, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties as an Investment
Promotion Mechanism: Testing the Effectiveness of the US BIT
Program’(2008) 9 Paterson Review 1
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in
Investment Rulemaking, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 (2007)
Aisbett, Emma, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct
Investment: Correlation Versus Causation’ in Karl P Sauvant and Lisa
E Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment:
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, And Investment
Flows (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 395-435.
Egger, Peter, and Valeria Merlo, ‘The Impact of Bilateral Investment
Treaties on FDI Dynamics’ (2007) 30(10) The World Economy 1536
Lim, Sokchea, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Foreign
Direct Investment (2007) 11(1)Asia Pacific Journal of Economics &
Business <https://ssrn.com/abstract=909760> 
Tobin, Jennifer, and Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Do They Stimulate Foreign Direct Investment?’ (2006) <
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.upf.edu/ContentPag
es/822485.pdf> accessed 28 February 2018
Gallagher, Kevin P, and Melissa Birch, ‘Do Investment Agreements
Attract Investment-Evidence from Latin America’ (2006) 7 Journal of
World Investment & Trade 961
Blonigen, Bruce A, ‘Foreign Direct Investment Behavior of
Multinational Corporations’ (2006) NBER Working Paper 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT |  19
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES
Banga, Rashmi, ‘Do Investment Agreements Matter? (2006) Journal of
Economic Integration 40
Neumayer, Eric, and Laura Spess, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?’ (2005)
33(10) World Development 1567
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Jennifer Tobin, ‘Foreign Direct
Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries:
The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2005) Yale Law &
Economics Research Paper No 293
Salacuse, Jeswald W, and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work:
An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand
Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 67
Egger, Peter, and Michael Pfaffermayr, ‘The Impact of Bilateral
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment’ (2004) 32(4) Journal
of Comparative Economics 788
Hallward-Dreimeier, Mary, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract
FDI? Only a Bit… And It Might Bite’ (2003) World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper Series 3121 
Agricultural landscape.
20 |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
ENDNOTES
ENDNOTES
1.        ‘UNCTAD Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator’ (Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD)
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS> accessed 26 February, 2018.
2.        This data is available from UNCTAD at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByYear.
3.        See, e.g., Lise Johnson, et al., “International Investment Agreements, 2014: A Review
of Trends and New Approaches” in Andrea Bjorklund (ed) Yearbook on International
Investment Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2016) 15 (discussing, among
other agreements, Brazil’s approach to investment treaties). 
4.        See Lise Johnson, ‘Aligning Swiss Investment Treaties with Sustainable
Development: An Assessment of Current Policy Coherence and Options for Future
Action’ (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, October 2015)
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/08/Aligning-Swiss-IIAs-with-SD-CCSI-June-
2016-.pdf> accessed 26 February 2018.
5.        Annex I contains a list of articles looking at the connections between investment
treaties and investment flows. Some studies find evidence of a correlation between
investment flows and investment treaties, while others do not. It is important to
note, however, that not all studies are of the same quality. Lauge N Poulsen
discusses a number of them and their results in Lauge N Poulsen, ‘The Importance
of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the
Evidence’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy
2009-2010 (Oxford University Press, 2010) 539-574 (hereafter, Poulsen, ‘The
Importance of BITs’). Most studies on the connection between investment treaties
and investment flows have looked specifically at whether the conclusion of such
treaties had an impact on flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) (as opposed to
other types of international investment). As has been remarked by several scholars,
these types of studies are problematic for a number of reasons, including that data
on FDI flows is often inaccurate or inadequately disaggregated, and that, even if
one were to find correlation between investment treaties and FDI flows, it would
be extremely difficult to establish that the treaties actually caused those
investments. See Poulsen, ‘The Importance of BITs’”; Emma Aisbett, ‘Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus causation’
in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct
Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment
Flows (Oxford University Press 2009) 395; Jason W Yackee, ‘Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Credible Commitment, and The Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs
promote foreign direct investment?’ (2008) 42 Law and Society Review 805. The
methodological limitations of existing studies are also explored in Joachim Pohl,
‘Societal Benefits and Costs of International Investment Agreements: A critical
review of aspects and available empirical evidence,’ (OECD Working Papers on
International Investment, No. 2018/01, 2018) < https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/societal-benefits-and-costs-of-international-
investment-agreements_e5f85c3d-en>. That study, published after this paper was
completed, finds as this paper does that the benefits of international investment
agreements are inconclusive, while evidence of the costs are mounting.
6.        Poulsen (n 5) 539-574.
7.        Lisa E Sachs and Karl P Sauvant, ‘BITs, DTTs, and FDI flows: An Overview’ in Sauvant
and Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford
University Press 2009) (‘It is clear, then, that no individual factor, such as an
investment treaty, could move FDI flows by itself, and it is equally clear that it is very
difficult to isolate the importance of any particular factor. To put it differently: if BITs
and DTTs affect FDI flows, they do so in the context of a host of other determinants,
with a number of them considerably more important than individual aspects of the
regulatory framework.’).
8.        See Linda Ensor, ‘New Law to Deal with Compensating Foreign Investors for Expropriation’
(Business Day, 18 February 2013) <http://bilaterals.org/spip.php?article22727>
accessed 26 February 2018; Rob Davies, ‘Letter: Termination of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Won’t Harm Relations’ (Business Live, 19 July 2013)
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/letters/2013-07-19-letter-termination-
of-bilateral-investment-treaties-wont-harm-relations/> accessed 26 February 2018.
The database compiled by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, which collects bilateral and multilateral investment agreements and
information about the conclusion about such agreements, notes that South Africa
has terminated its investment treaties with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic
Union, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and Austria. Agreements remain with countries such as China, Russia,
and Mauritius. See also ‘IIAs by Economy: South Africa’ (Investment Policy Hub
UNCTAD) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195> accessed
19 February 2018.
9.        fDi Intelligence, The fDi Report 2016: Global Greenfield Investment Trend (fDi
Intelligence, 2016) 14, <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/Landing-Pages/fDi-Report-
2016/The-fDi-Report-2016> accessed 26 February 2018.
10.      See ‘IIAs by Economy: Indonesia’ (Investment Policy Hub UNCTAD)
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/97#iiaInnerMenu>
accessed19 February 2018.
11.      fDi Intelligence (n 9) 4.
12.      ibid.
13.      ibid, 1, 9.
14.      Sachs and Sauvant (n 7).
15.      Law firms advise investors to adopt these strategies. See, among others, Mark
Mangan and Henry Defriez, ‘How to Protect Investments in Indonesia Despite the
Termination of Its Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (Dechert On Point 8 September 2015)
<https://info.dechert.com/10/5454/uploads/dechert-onpoint---how-to-protect-
investments-in-indonesia-despite-the-termination-of-its-bilateral-investment-
treaties--9-2015.pdf>. This note states that, even if Indonesia were to terminate its
BITs, investors could still seek investment protection through its multilateral
investment treaties (MIT) or free trade agreements (FTA) with investment chapters.
It further states: However, not any BIT, MIT or FTA will do. They each vary according
to their terms. Dechert’s international arbitration team is available to advise investors
on which investment treaties provide the optimal range of protections for a particular
investment depending on the jurisdiction in which the investment is made and the
types of disputes that the investor is likely to encounter. (Ibid 6).
16.      The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is a self-sustaining United States
Government agency that helps American businesses invest in emerging markets.
See https://www.opic.gov/.
17.      World Economic Forum, ‘The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018’ (World
Economic Forum, 26 September 2017) < https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-
global-competitiveness-report-2017-2018> accessed 27 February 2018.
18.      Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt, ‘Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty
Violations on Foreign Direct Investment’ (2011) 65 International Organization 401.
19.      ‘Bear Creek Files Notice of Intent to Arbitrate With Peruvian Government In
Connection With The Santa Ana Project; Six Month Consultation Period Begins’
(Cision, 7 February 2014) < https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/bear-creek-
files-notice-of-intent-to-arbitrate-with-peruvian-government-in-connection-with-
the-santa-ana-project-six-month-consultation-period-begins-513692941.html>
accessed 27 February 2018.
20.      Rachel L Wellhausen, ‘Bondholders vs. Direct Investors? Competing Responses to
Expropriation’ (2015) 59 International Studies Quarterly 1.
21.      ibid.
22.      David Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss:
Insights from Advanced Systems of Corporate Law’ (2014) OECD Working Papers on
International Investment 2014/02 < http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-
policy/WP-2014_02.pdf> accessed 27 February 2018. See also OECD, Business and
Finance Outlook 2016 (OECD Publishing 2016), 223 < https://www.oecd.org/daf/OECD-
Business-Finance-Outlook-2016-Highlights.pdf > accessed 27 February 2018.
23.      OECD (n 22), 224, 246.
24.      ibid, 224, 239-43.
25.      The literature on impacts is too voluminous to cite here. Nevertheless, some research
highlighting challenges and complexities in terms of effects on the host country’s
domestic industry include the following: Nigel Driffield and Dylan Hughes, ‘Foreign and
Domestic Investment: Regional Development or Crowding Out?’ (2003) 37 Regional
Studies 277; George Chen, Yao Yao and Julien Malizard, ‘Does FDI Crowd In or Crowd
Out Private Domestic Investment in China? The Effect of Entry Mode’ (2017) 61 Economic
Modelling 409. Some of the negative impacts of FDI may be felt in the short term, with
positive effects materializing over the longer term: Jennifer W Spencer, ‘The Impact of
Multinational Enterprise Strategy on Indigenous Enterprises: Horizontal Spillovers and
Crowding Out in Developing Countries’ (2008) 33 Academy of Management Review 341.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT |  21
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES
26.      Florence Jaumotte, Subir Lall and Chris Papageorgiou, ‘Rising Income Inequality:
Technology or Trade and Financial Globalization?’ (2008) IMF Working Papers 08/185
< https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08185.pdf> accessed 27
February 2018.
27.      See e.g., Pablo M. Pinto and Boliang Zhu, ‘Fortune or Evil? The Effect of Inward
Foreign Direct Investment on Corruption’ (2016) 60 International Studies Quarterly
693 (arguing that whether FDI impacts corruption depends on the institutions and
level of development in the host country, with risks that FDI will worsen corruption
being greater for less developed countries than for developed countries).
28.      See e.g., Sung Jin Park and others, ‘Is Foreign Direct Investment Effective from the
Perspective of Tax Avoidance? An Analysis of Tax Avoidance Through the
International Transfer Pricing Behaviors of Korean Corporations’ (2016) 32 The
Journal of Applied Business Research 917.
29.      Andreea Michalache-O’Keef and Quan Li, ‘Modernization vs. Dependency Revisited:
Effects of FDI on Food Security in Less Developed Countries’ (2011) 55 International
Studies Quarterly 71; Mehdi Ben Slimane, Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon and Habib
Zitouna, ‘The role of sectoral FDI in promoting agricultural production and
improving food security’ (2015) 145 International Economics 50.
30.      See e.g., Jiajia Zheng and Pengfei Sheng, ‘The Impact of FDI on the Environment: Market
Perspectives and Evidence from China’ (2017) 5 Economies 8; Tomasz Kozluk and
Christina Timiliotis, ‘Do Environmental Policies Affect Global Value Chains?’ (2016) OECD
Economic Department Working Papers 1282 <http://www.oecd-
i l i b r a r y . o r g / d o c s e r v e r / d o w n l o a d / 5 j m 2 h h 7 n f 3 w d -
en.pdf?expires=1519755869&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=BECE4907CCA13FB61
C0BB444A6BF55FB> accessed 27 February 2018; Steven Poelhekke and Frederick van
der Ploeg, ‘Green Havens and Pollution Havens’ (2015) 38 The World Economy 1159;
Natalia Zugravu-Soilita, ‘How Does FDI Affect Pollution? Toward a Better Understanding
of the Direct and Conditional Effects’ (2017) 66 Environmental Resource Economics 293.
31.      Kozluk and Timiliotis (n 30).
32.      See e.g., Matthew Cole and Per Fredricksson, ‘Institutionalized Pollution Havens’ (2008)
68 Ecological Economics 1239; Matthew Cole, Robert Elliott and Per Fredriksson,
‘Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?’ (2006)
108 Scandinavian Journal of Economics 157; Kozluk and Timiliotis (n 30); Yuquing Xing
and Charles D Kolstad, ‘Do Lax Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?’
(2002) 21 Environmental and Resource Economics 1.
33.      On this point, see for example, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Guide to Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in
Investment Policymaking (LSE Investment and Human Rights Project, Centre for the Study
of Human Rights at London School of Economics, 2016) 18; Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Progress Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights on Legal Options and Practical Measures To Improve
Access to Remedy for Victims of Business-Related Human Rights Abuses’, (Annual report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights A/HRC/2/39, 7 May 2015) <
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session29/Pages/ListReport
s.aspx> accessed 27 February 2018.
34.      Exceptions to this principle are few. One includes arbitral decisions and a few
recently negotiated texts such as the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA) that preclude investors from turning to ISDS if they have
procured their investment through fraud or corruption. (See e.g., CETA, art. 8.18(3)).
These decisions and treaties, however, generally do permit investors to bring claims
if they have engaged in fraud or corruption during the life of the investment. Another
exception to that general rule that investors can invoke ISDS irrespective of their
conduct or impacts is the language in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that bars
investors from challenging tobacco control measures. (TPP, art. 29.5).
35.      See e.g., Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland) v Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/10/7,
Decision on Jurisdiction (2 July 2013), paras 193-210; Quiborax SA v Bolivia, ICSID
Case No ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction (27 September 2012), paras 220, 235-
237; Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v Chile, ICSID Case No
ARB/98/2, Award (8 May 2008), para 232. 
36.      Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/10, Dissenting
Opinion to Decision on Annulment (16 April 2009), para 22. 
37.      Additionally, it is unclear whether a significant share of outward investors from
developing countries will be able to benefit from investment treaty protection. Studies
repeatedly find that most claimants in investor-state arbitration are from developed
countries and that, while the system of investor-state arbitration is technically open
to all investors, the costs are high – averaging nearly USD 6 million per side – and
could be prohibitive, especially for small firms without high-value claims that can
make incurring those expenses worthwhile, or that can attract a third-party funder to
finance the arbitration. See, among others, Jeffrey P Commission, ‘How Much Does
an ICSID Arbitration Cost? A Snapshot of the Last Five Years’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog,
29 February 2016) http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/02/29/how-much-does-an-
icsid-arbitration-cost-a-snapshot-of-the-last-five-years/ accessed 27 February 2018.
38.      See e.g., Mona Ali, ‘Dark matter, black holes and old-fashioned exploitation:
transnational corporations and the US economy’ (2016) 40(4) Cambridge Journal
of Economics, 997; OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013),
17-18; Alexander Bulatov, ‘Offshore Orientation of Russian Federation FDI’ (2017)
24 Transnational Corporations 71.
39.      Lisa Sachs and Lise Johnson, ‘Investment Treaties, Investor-State Dispute Settlement
and Inequality: How International Rules and Institutions Can Exacerbate Domestic
Disparities’, in José Antonio Ocampo (ed.), International Rules and Inequality: Implications
for Global Economic Governance (Columbia University Press, forthcoming, 2018).
40.      ‘Insurance Eligibility Checklist’ (OPIC) <https://www.opic.gov/doing-business-
us/applicant-screener/insurance-eligibility-checklist> accessed 27 February 2018.
41.      See e.g., discussion in Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Politicized Dispute Settlement in the
Pre-Investment Treaty Era: A Micro-Historical Approach’ (2017) University of
Wisconsin Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series 1412 <
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2968988 > accessed 1 June 2017; Martins Paparinskis,
‘The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration’ (2010)
Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law <
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716833> accessed 15
February 2017. Paparinskis explains that one can view the goal of depoliticization
from four perspectives: from the perspective of the home state, the host state, the
investor, and the system of dispute resolution. This note focuses on depoliticization
as viewed from the perspective of the home and host states.
42.      Paparinskis (n 41) 5-9.
43.      ibid 9-12.
44.      Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, August 25, 1965, 17 UST 1270, TIAS. No 6090, 575 UNTS
159 (entered in force October 14, 1966).
45.      Ibrahim FI Shihata, ‘Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The
Roles of ICSID and MIGA’ (1986) 1(1) ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal 1.
46.      See e.g. Zoe Williams, ‘Investigation: As Colombia Pushes for Cancer Drug Price-Cut
and Considers Compulsory Licensing, Novartis Responds with Quiet Filing of an
Investment Treaty Notice’ (IAReporter 30 November 2016) <
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/investigation-as-colombia-pushes-for-cancer-
drug-price-cut-and-considers-compulsory-licensing-novartis-responds-with-quiet-
filing-of-an-investment-treaty-notice/> accessed 27 February 2018 (discussing a
letter sent by the head of the Bilateral Economic Relations Division of the Swiss
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs to the Colombian ministry of health linking
the issuance of a compulsory license to expropriation and mentioning relevant
trade and investment agreements, and also discussing alleged pressure from U.S.
Congressional staff and other officials regarding a compulsory license move and
linking such move to funding for the Paz Colombia process.).
47.      1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) art 27 (ICSID Convention).
48.      In some cases, a multinational enterprise based in Country A, which has routed its
investment in Country C through Country B, has had the home state of Country A
place diplomatic pressure on the government in Country C, while also bringing an
ISDS claim against Country C under the Country B-Country C investment treaty.
See, e.g., ADC v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/03/16, Award (2 October 2006). 
49.      In SGS v Pakistan, for example, Switzerland submitted a letter to the tribunal
regarding its interpretation of the umbrella clause between Switzerland and
Pakistan. It did this after the tribunal had issued its award rejecting jurisdiction: Note
on Interpretation of Article 11 of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Switzerland
and Pakistan in the light of the Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction
of ICSID in Case No. ARB/01/13 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance v Pakistan, 19
Mealey’s International Arbitration Reporter E3 (February 2004). In other cases, the
home state has made submissions while the dispute is pending. This happens
frequently, for example, in disputes that arise under the North American Free Trade
Agreement though, when the non-disputing state parties to that treaty make
submissions, those submissions often weigh in favor of a narrow interpretation of
22 |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
ENDNOTES
the treaty, as opposed to one that necessarily benefits their respective investors. See
also discussion in Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Non-Disputing State Submissions in
Investment Arbitration’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (ed) Diplomatic and
Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 316-319.
50.      While that action may be a “legal” action pursued under the treaty’s dispute
settlement mechanisms, the decision regarding whether to pursue that action is
arguably “political”, as are issues of what arguments the state will make or not
make. Additionally, that “legal” claim, once brought, may also be settled through a
political or diplomatic process. 
51.      Srividya Jandhyala, Geoffrey Gertz and Lauge N Skovgaard Poulsen, ‘Legalization and
Diplomacy: American power and the investment regime’ (preliminary draft, 6 April
2016) <https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/Legalization-
and-diplomacy_Poulsen.pdf> accessed 1 March 2017.
52.      ibid 28-29.
53.      Jason Yackee, ‘Politicized Dispute Settlement in the Pre-Investment Treaty Era: A
Micro-Historical Approach’ (2017) University of Wisconsin Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper Series 1412, 3. 
54.      See e.g., Commission (n 37); Matthew Hodgson, ‘Costs in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: The Case for Reform’ in Jean E. Kalicki and Anna Joubin-Bret (eds)
Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st
Century (Brill 2014) 748, 756. 
55.      Commission (n 37). 
56.      The Yukos cases are: Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 226, Final Award (18 July 2014); Yukos Universal Limited
(Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 227, Final Award
(18 July 2014); Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 228, Final Award (18 July 2014). This sum does not
include any post-award costs incurred by Russia in challenging the awards or
resisting enforcement. 
57.      The tribunal rejected the investor/claimant’s claims and ordered it to cover some
(USD 15 million) of Turkey’s defense costs: Libananco Holdings Co Limited v Turkey,
ICSID Case No ARB/06/8, Award (2 September 2011), paras 559-569. The claimant
subsequently sought to annul the award and was again unsuccessful. Turkey incurred
additional costs in these annulment proceedings, but the annulment committee
decided it should bear those costs, rejecting Turkey’s request that the
claimant/investor reimburse the government for having to defend itself again. The
publicly available portions of the decision on annulment do not indicate how much
either party spent in connection with the annulment proceedings: Libananco Holdings
Co Limited v Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/06/8, Excerpts of Decision on Annulment made
pursuant to Rules 48 (4) and 53 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules of 2006 (22 May 2013). 
58.      See e.g., Renco Group, Inc v Peru, ICSID Case No UNCT/13/1, Final Award (9
November 2016). In this case, which arose when Peru imposed sanctions on a
company for allegedly failing to comply with environmental standards, the tribunal
noted that, under the applicable arbitration rules, the principle was that the “costs
follow the event” – that is, the losing party should pay the prevailing party’s litigation
expenses. Although the tribunal had dismissed the claimant’s claims, the arbitrators
decided to depart from that general rule that the loser should pay the winner’s
costs, and required Peru to bear its own costs (roughly USD 8.4 million) as well as
50% of the roughly USD 850,000 in costs, fees and expenses for the arbitration and
arbitrators. Thus, Peru faced a USD 9 million dollar bill for an action taken to address
environmental and health concerns.
59.      Hodgson (n 54) 756.
60.      This is not hypothetical: One study of cases in which investor/claimants were ordered
to pay all or some of the respondent’s legal costs found that the investor only paid
the awards in full in 49% of those cases found that investors had only paid cost
awards in full in 49% of cases. The investors paid a portion of the cost award in 14%
of the cases studied, but had refused or failed to pay cost awards in 37%. See Iván
Zarak A, ‘Effective Protection for Respondent States Against Judgment-Proof
Claimants’ (Memorandum, 12 September 2016), 2-3 (citing relevant studies) <
http://res.cloudinary.com/lbresearch/image/upload/v1477064514/rop_memorand
um_to_icsid_administrative_council_re_effective_protection_english_version_2_2
19116_1641.pdf> accessed 27 February 2018.
61.      ibid 4-6.
62.      UNCTAD, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016 [2017]
1 IIA Issues Note < http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d1_en.pdf>
accessed 27 February 2018.
63.      PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘2015 – International Arbitration Damages Research’ (2015)
Arbitral Awards In Focus 3 <https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/assets/international-
arbitation-damages-research-2015.pdf> accessed 27 February 2018. ibid 9
64.      ibid.
65.      ibid.
66.      ibid.
67.      Allee and Peinhardt (n 18).
68.      While, in general, ISDS tribunals award monetary damages against states, and do
not compel them to take or not take regulatory measures, those awards of monetary
damages can make pursuing certain regulatory policies or practices cost prohibitive.
69.      See e.g., Ampal-American Israel Corp v Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/12/11, Decision on
Liability and Heads of Loss (21 February 2017). In Ampal-American, the tribunal
adopted a ‘conceptual severance’ approach that has been rejected by the US
Supreme Court its regulatory takings/indirect expropriation cases. By ‘conceptually
severing’ property rights, courts and tribunals make it easier for claimants/plaintiffs
to establish that a regulation amounts to an expropriation.
70.      See e.g., Jan Kleinheisterkamp, 'Who is Afraid of Investor-State Arbitration? Or
Comparative Law' (2014), LSE Policy Briefing Paper No. 4
<https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2483775> accessed 31 March 2018; Lise Johnson
and Alexander Volkov, ‘Investor-State Contracts, Host-State “Commitments” and
the Myth of Stability in International Law’ (2013) 24 American Review of
International Arbitration 361.
71.      Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration (Hart 2009) 22.
72.      David Kennedy, ‘Some Caution about Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic
Development’ (2011) 1 Accounting, Economics, and Law 1, 11.
73.      The cases on this issue are numerous. For one relatively recent award, see, e.g.,
Murphy Exploration and Production Co v Ecuador, PCA Case No 2012-16, Partial Final
Award (6 May 2016), para. 206.
74.      See e.g., Murphy v Ecuador (n 73) para 206 (noting that the issue of whether or not there
has been a breach of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation does not depend
on whether the government was acting in good faith); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret
Ve Sanayi AS v Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/03/29, Award (27 August 2009), para 181.
75.      Lise Johnson, 'Space for Local Content Strategies: A Crucial Time to Revisit an Old
Debate' (GiZ 2016)].
76.      ibid.
77.      Ampal-American Israel Corp (n 69).
78.      Rob Howse, ‘ICSID Arbitrators Turn Investment Treaty into Insurance Policy Against
Terrorism’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 7 March 2017)
<http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/03/icsid-arbitrators-turn-investment-
treaty-into-insurance-policy-against-terrorism.html> accessed 27 February 2018.
79.      ibid.
80.      Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-2, Award (15 March
2016), para. 6.83. See also Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 'Input to
the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights Regarding Guidance on
Human Rights Defenders and the Role of Business' (15 March 2018)
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/05/Input-regarding-guidance-on-human-
rights-defenders-and-the-role-of-business-REV.pdf> accessed 31 March 2018.
81.      Providing foreign investors special protections, access to arbitration, and potential
recourse to monetary damages may distort conditions of competition relevant for
foreign and domestic investors, favoring the former but not the latter. This is
arguably inconsistent the investment policies of many governments, which
frequently aim to ensure equal treatment is provided to foreign and domestic
investors alike.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT |  23
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES
82.      For a discussion of ISDS cases related to the extractive industries, see, e.g., Lise
Johnson and Jesse Coleman, ‘International Investment Law and the Extractive
Industries’ (2016) CCSI Briefing Note < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/01/2016-
01-12_Investment-Law-and-Extractives_Briefing-Note_1.pdf> accessed 27 February
2018; for a discussion of ISDS cases related to infrastructure investments, see e.g., Lise
Johnson, ‘The Impact of Investment Treaties on Governance of Private Investment in
Infrastructure’ (2014) EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2014/32. See also UNCTAD, ‘Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2016’ (n 62).
83.      PSEG v Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/02/5, Award (19 January 2007); Bilcon of Delaware
v Canada, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No 2009-04, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability (17 March 2015); Windstream Energy LLC v Canada, PCA,
Award (27 September 2016).
84.      A number of cases raising this issue arose from Ecuador’s efforts to impose “windfall
profits taxes” on oil companies during the time of soaring oil prices. Even though the
underlying contracts did not contain stabilization provisions, a number of tribunals
concluded that changes in the fiscal framework above a certain point violated the
fair and equitable treatment obligation. See e.g., Murphy Exploration & Production
Company International v Ecuador, Case No AA434 (2012-16), PCA, Final Award (10
February 2017) and Partial Final Award (6 May 2016); Occidental Petroleum Corp v
Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012); Perenco Ecuador Ltd v
Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and
Liability (12 September 2014). Other relevant cases arose in the context of Argentina’s
financial crisis. See discussion of cases in Lise Johnson and Alexander Volkov,
‘Investor-State Contracts, Host-State “Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in
International Law’ (2013) 24 American Review of International Arbitration 361.
85.      See e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp (n 84) (holding that government’s termination
of contract in accordance with contractual provisions violated the investment
treaty’s requirement of proportionality).
86.      Report of the ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force on Third-Party Funding (International
Council for Commercial Arbitration, forthcoming) ch 8.
87.      See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp (n 84) (allowing the investor/claimant to avoid
the consequences of a contractual provision enabling the government to terminate
the contract, and to benefit from an implied stabilization clause which effectively
capped the government’s windfall profit tax); Teco Guatemala Holdings v
Guatemala, ICSID Case No ARB/10/23, Award (19 December 2013) and Decision on
Annulment (5 April 2016) (in the award, the tribunal found a procedural violation in
the method in which the tariffs were calculated but then awarded the claimant the
value of its requested tariffs as if its rights under the concession were to receive
those rates. The decision was upheld on annulment). 
88.      Governments often sign investor-state contracts with companies, which if covered
by investment treaties, can bring ISDS claims; importantly, investors in those
companies can also potentially bring their own investor-state claims, resulting in
multiple claims arising out of the same concession and the same government
conduct. See e.g., Urbaser SA v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26, Award (8
December 2016); Impregilo v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/17, Award (21 June
2011). Both cases arose out of the same water services concession in Argentina and
the government’s treatment of that concession. The concession contract had been
signed between Aguas del Gran Buenos Aires (AGBA) and the Province of Buenos
Aires. Urbaser and Impregilo were both shareholders in AGBA.
89.      See discussions in Brooke Guven and Lise Johnson, 'PPPs and ISDS: A Risky
Combination' (forthcoming) UNCTAD Investment Policy Blog; Lise Johnson, 'The
Impact of Investment Treaties on Governance of Private Investment in
Infrastructure' (2014) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Research Studies,
Research Paper No. RSCAS 2014/32.
90.      Johnson and Volkov (n 84) (discussing how US courts would, for example, refuse to
enforce promises of future regulatory treatment or outcomes if those promises were
not substantively and procedurally valid under domestic law). 
91.      See e.g., In re Attorney General of Canada v Clayton, Notice of Application, Court File
No: T-1000-15 (16 June 2015). In this filing, the government of Canada argued that
the tribunal’s decision against it in Bilcon v Canada (n 83) ‘usurp[ed] the judicial
review function of Canadian courts’.
92.      See e.g., Philip Morris Asia Limited v Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on
admissibility and jurisdiction (17 December 2015). See also Ashurst, ‘Developments
in Investor-State Arbitration: Thinking Outside the Box’ (Arbflash, 1 May 2016) <
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/developments-in-
investor-state-arbitration-thinking-outside-the-box-arbflash-may-2016/> accessed
27 February 2018 (‘[I]t took four and a half years to obtain a decision on jurisdiction
alone. While many of the materials are not public, a review of the Procedural Orders
shows that a huge amount of time was spent on resolving a preliminary issue. That
time and cost may itself be a disincentive for States (particularly smaller States) to
adopt regulatory measures which could trigger claims: it is perhaps unlikely to
prevent States adopting measures of political/national significance but more
modest/technical reforms may be affected.’).
93.      Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties: A Legal and
Economic Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2014) 127 (citing Kyla Tienharra,
‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science’ in Evolution
in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2011) 606, 615).
94.      This issue has also been raised by Bonnitcha (n 92) 118-127. 
95.      See e.g., Agnieszka Zarowna, ‘Termination of BITs and Sunset Clauses – What Can
Investors in Poland Expect?’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 28 February
2017)<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/02/28/booked-22-february-polish-
bits/> accessed 20 August 2017 (noting that the Czech Republic, Indonesia, and Peru
have terminated at least some of their treaties along with the treaties’ survival clauses).
96.      This power is recognized under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art
31(3). It is also provided for in IIAs that expressly give state parties to the treaty the
right to make submissions in disputes (see e.g., NAFTA art 1128) and to issue binding
interpretations (see e.g., NAFTA arts 1131, 1132), and in some arbitral rules, most
notably the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Arbitration: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 3311 (VCLT); North American
Free Trade Agreement, Can-Mex-US, 8, 11, 14 & 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 289 & 605
(NAFTA); UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Arbitration (2014) art 5. For discussions of these issues, see e.g., Anthea Roberts,
‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States’
(2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 179; Kathryn Gordon and Joachim
Pohl, ‘Investment Treaties Over Time – Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a
Changing World’ (2015) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2015/02
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2015-02.pdf> accessed
20 August 2017; Lise Johnson, ‘Ripe for Refinement: The State’s Role in
Interpretation of FET, MFN, and Shareholder Rights’ (2015) GEG Working Paper
2015/101 <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/GEG-WP_101-Ripe-for-
Refinement-The-States-Role-in-Interpretation-of-FET-MFN-and-Shareholder-Rights-
Lise-Johnson_0.pdf> accessed 20 August 2017.
97.      India has taken these actions, seeking both to clarify treaties through
interpretations and terminate existing treaties: Government of India, Ministry of
Finance, ‘Issuing Joint Interpretative Statements for Indian Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (Office Memorandum, 8 February 2016),
<http://indiainbusiness.nic.in/newdesign/upload/Consolidated_Interpretive-
Statement.pdf> accessed 27 February 2018. For commentary, see e.g., Sarthak
Malhotra, ‘India’s Joint Interpretive Statement for BITs: An Attempt to Slay the Ghosts
of the Past’ (Investment Treaty News 12 December 2016),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/12/12/indias-joint-interpretive-statement-for-bits-an-
attempt-to-slay-the-ghosts-of-the-past-sarthak-malhotra/ accessed 27 February 2018.
98.      See e.g., Johnson and Volkov (n 84). 
99.      Anecdotal evidence indicates that it is not common for governments to involve
officials from “non-economic” agencies or ministries in developing investment
treaty policy or shaping negotiations. There are, however, some examples of
countries such as the United States who do provide for such input.
100.   When formulating its investment treaty policy, Brazil consulted with its investors,
and ultimately adopted a model that does not include ISDS, protections against
expropriation, or requirements of FET, but does include other features such as an
ombudsman to identify and resolve barriers faced by foreign investors.
101.   Yoram Z Haftel and Alexander Thompson, ‘Delayed ratification: the domestic fate
of bilateral investment treaties’ (2013) 67 International Organization 355.
102.   See Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
Public Interest and U.S. Domestic Law’ (CCSI Policy Paper May 2015)
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-
Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf> accessed 27 February 2018. 
103.   The United States, for instance, recently took three years to review its Model BIT.
Initiative undertaken by South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, India, and the EU similarly involve
multi-year efforts and have used various strategies for engaging different stakeholders.
ccsi.columbia.edu
Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment
Jerome Greene Hall 
435 West 116th Street 
New York, NY 10027
Phone: +1(212) 854-1830 
Fax: +1(212) 854-7946
images p. 4 © Denis Zhitnik; p. 5 © pradeep_kmpk14; p. 6 ©
In Green; p. 10 © tuanzhariff; p. 15 © 2seven9; p. 16 ©
imacoconut; p. 19 © Milosz_G.
